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The Standard of Review in the 1994
Antidumping Code: Circumscribing the




The past decade witnessed an increased use of antidumping
measures.1 Antidumping laws are now so frequently invoked
that they constitute a threat to liberal trade. At both the Tokyo
and Uruguay Rounds of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, negoti-
ators tried to instill more discipline in the substantive rules
guiding the use of antidumping laws. Improvements to the dis-
pute settlement system were also geared toward this goal. At
the Uruguay Round,2 the standard of review in antidumping
cases assumed an unprecedented importance because the
United States, 3 backed by the European Union, insisted that a
very limited standard be written into the 1994 Antidumping
Code (AD Code). The crucial question was how much deference
GATT 4 Panels should accord national authorities when review-
ing their determinations.
The effectiveness of international surveillance of antidump-
ing laws depends partly on the level of scrutiny that GATT
Panels apply in reviewing the determinations of national au-
* LL.B (Nig.); LL.M (Univ. of Michigan Law School); Lecturer, Faculty of
Law, University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus. The author is grateful to Prof.
John H. Jackson for his comments on the first draft of this article.
1. The United States, Canada, Australia, and the European Community
are the four jurisdictions that most actively use their antidumping laws. See
ANTI-DuMPING LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (John H. Jackson &
Edwin A. Vermulst eds., 1989).
2. The results of the Round are found in GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE NE-
GOTIATIONS, THE URUGUAY ROUND (Institute for International Legal Informa-
tion ed., 1993) (Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter UR RESULTS].
3. See U.S. Requests Reopening of GATT Antidumping Text, Seeks Major
Changes, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 18, 1992, at S-1.
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. Pts. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
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thorities. Most nations, particularly developing nations, favored
broader standards of review to halt the encroaching protection-
ist abuses of antidumping laws.5 To them, the broad discretion
which successive antidumping codes allow domestic authorities
could be counter-balanced by allowing Panels wide powers of re-
view. The United States and the European Union, however, in-
sisted on a highly restrictive standard of review that may
compromise the reforms achieved at the Uruguay Round.
Even though express provisions on standards of review did
not exist prior to the 1994 AD Code,6 GATT Panels had con-
fronted the issue in a number of antidumping cases. Parties dis-
agreed on the extent of a Panel's power to second guess domestic
authorities. GATT Panels consistently avoided taking a definite
stand on this question. In the absence of specific guidelines,
they adopted a case-by-case approach, but a review of the cases
shows that Panels often deferred to the conclusions of national
authorities. At the same time, Panels resisted any attempts to
unduly restrain their power to undertake an in-depth review
where necessary.
This Article examines standards of review in GATT juris-
prudence prior to 1994 and analyzes the likely impact of Article
17.6 of the 1994 AD Code on the performance of GATT Panels.
It explores the extent to which Panels are likely to be con-
strained by the prescribed standard, and whether that standard
differs significantly from pre-Uruguay Round practice.
The Article is divided into five parts. Part I explains the na-
ture of antidumping laws. Part II examines the improvements
made to the general dispute settlement system.7 Part III ana-
lyzes the standard of review applied in antidumping cases in the
United States and the European Union. Judicial review of an-
tidumping cases in both jurisdictions is characterized by consid-
erable deference to the agencies in charge of administering
antidumping laws. These agencies are allowed wide discretion-
ary powers that enable them to manipulate antidumping laws
for protectionist purposes.8 Part IV analyzes antidumping cases
5. Robert W. McGee, The Case to Repeal the Antidumping Laws, 13 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 491, 491-96 (1993).
6. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994, in UR
RESULTS, supra note 2 [hereinafter 1994 AD Code].
7. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes, in UR RESULTS, supra note 2 [hereinafter DSU].
8. For a comparative analysis of antidumping laws and practice in the
main user countries, see ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 1; NA-
TIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (Meinhard Hilf &
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to determine the standard of review Panels observed when no
guidelines were expressly provided in the AD Code, and how
this compares with the standard of review in Article 17.6. Fi-
nally, part V discusses the standard of review incorporated in
Article 17.6 of the 1994 AD Code.
This Article concludes that the effectiveness of GATT dis-
pute resolution in antidumping cases may ultimately depend on
the integrity of Panelists. Notwithstanding the constraints of
the standard of review prescribed by Article 17.6, a courageous
Panel could still find a way to realize the goals of consistency
and uniformity in the application of antidumping laws. In addi-
tion, the political will of Members to accept unfavorable deci-
sions is crucial to GATT's credibility.9
I. THE NATURE OF ANTIDUMPING LAWS
Antidumping laws serve as countermeasures to anti-com-
petitive behavior. They also serve as an "interface" mechanism,
bridging the regulatory differences that exist between econo-
mies, even those that are otherwise very similar.10 Unfortu-
nately, these laws increasingly stray from their original purpose
and are frequently used for protectionist purposes.11 The 1980s
saw an explosive use of antidumping laws for safeguard pur-
Ernst-Ulrich Petersman eds., 1993); TRADE LAWS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
AND THE UNITED STATES IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (P. Demaret et al. eds.,
1991).
9. Such political will seems to be lacking in the United States where the
GATT implementing legislation provides that the United States should pull out
of the WTO if the latter renders judgment against the United States three con-
secutive times. Charles M. Gastle & Jean-G. Castel, Q.C., Should the North
American Free Trade Agreement Dispute Settlement Mechanism in Antidump-
ing and Countervailing Duty Cases be Reformed in the Light of Softwood Lum-
ber III?, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 823, 893 (1995). It was because of this
compromise that the U.S. Congress approved the WTO Bill.
10. JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIc RELATIONS 650-51 (1986).
11. The U.S. Council of Economic Advisers concluded in its 1994 Report to
the President that antidumping laws, in the United States and elsewhere, are
often used for "protecting domestic industries from foreign competition." F.
Amanda DeBusk, Dumping Laws Still Endanger the Deal, N.Y. TIMES, April 17,
1994, § 3, at 13.
Jagdish Bhagwati, who consistently defends AD measures, has subse-
quently decried the capture of the processes by protectionist forces who have
turned them into de facto instruments of protection. Jagdish Bhagwati, Is Free
Trade Passe After All?, 125 WELTWIRTSCHAFrLICHES ARCHLY 17, 25 (1980).
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poses.' 2 With significant tariff reductions achieved at previous
rounds, governments succumbed to pressures from domestic
producers to use antidumping laws to reduce foreign
competition.
The antidumping policies of GATT signatories are based, in
principle, on Article VI of the GATT. Because Article VI lacked
specificity, it was supplemented by successive AD Codes. The
first AD Code, 13 negotiated in 1966-67 during the Kennedy
Round, was eventually replaced by the 1979 Code 14 that
emerged from the Tokyo Round. Further revision at the Uru-
guay Round yielded the 1994 AD Code. 15 The GATT does not
prohibit dumping. 16 Instead, it vests in the contracting parties
the right to levy antidumping duties in defined circumstances.
Many experts consider the economic justification for an-
tidumping action weak, and its concept of unfair price unprinci-
pled.' 7 A fundamental conflict exists between antidumping
policies and domestic competition policies.' 8 Unlike domestic
competition laws, GATT antidumping law is criticized because it
does not require proof of any predatory intent.' 9 The difficulty
12. David Palmeter & Gregory J. Spak, Resolving Antidumping and Coun-
tervailing Duty Disputes: Defining GATTs Role in an Era of Increasing Conflict,
24 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1145, 1145-46 (1993).
13. Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, June 30, 1967, art. 2, 19 U.S.T. 4348.
14. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, BISD 26th Supp. 171 (1980).
15. See supra note 6. Unlike the previous codes, the 1994 AD Code is
mandatory for all members of the WTO. Id.
16. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 402 (1969)
[hereinafter JACKSON, WORLD TRADE]. Article VI provides, inter alia, that "the
Contracting Parties recognize that dumping... is to be condemned if it causes
or threatens material injury to an established industry in the territory of a con-
tracting party or materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry."
GATT, supra note 4, art. VI, sec. 1.
17. See John J. Barcelo III, A History of GATT Unfair Trade Remedy
Law-Confusion of Purposes, 14 WORLD ECON. 311 (1991); Edwin A. Vermulst,
The Antidumping Systems of Australia, Canada, the EEC and the USA: Have
Antidumping Laws Become a Problem in International Trade?, in ANTIDUMP-
ING LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 425, 459-60; Edwin A. Vermulst, A
European Practitioner's View of the GATT System: Should Competition Law Vi-
olations Distorting International Trade Be Subject to GATT Panels?, 27 J.
WORLD TRADE, Apr. 1993, at 55.
18. Barcelo, supra note 17, at 313. Barcelo describes GA'IT antidumping
law as "a hybrid of antitrust and safeguard policies awkwardly resting on a
confused notion of unfairness." Id.
19. Klaus Stegemann, The International Regulation of Dumping: Protec-
tion Made Too Easy, 14 WORLD ECON. 375, 376 (1991).
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of proving predatory intent might justify its exclusion from this
highly sensitive area of trade policy.
Notwithstanding the existence of adjudicatory processes at
the agency level and of domestic judicial review, the practical
application of antidumping laws lacks coherence. 20 This inco-
herence results partly because courts find it more difficult to ad-
judicate result-oriented rules that leave much discretion to
administrative authorities.21 In addition, antidumping laws are
drafted in highly technical terms that deliberately enhance their
ambiguity and vagueness and thus insulate their application
from the charged political atmosphere that surrounds trade
disputes. 22
Protection is obtained more easily under antidumping laws
than under Article XIX Safeguard Provisions. This probably ex-
plains the increased use of antidumping protection as a substi-
tute for safeguard protection.23 The triggering level of injury to
domestic producers is lower for antidumping laws than for the
Safeguard Provisions. 24 Furthermore, antidumping laws do not
require compensation or retaliation.25 McGee sums up the criti-
cisms of antidumping laws as follows:
[Aintidumping laws .. .serve no public interest, but merely protect
producers at the expense of everyone else. They result in deadweight
20. Robert E. Hudec, The Role of Judicial Review in Preserving Liberal
Foreign Trade Policies, in NATIONAL CONsTrrITIONS AND INTERNATIONAL Eco-
NoMIc LAw, supra note 8, at 503, 512. Recent legal scholarship concludes that
the work product of U.S. agencies and courts under the antidumping laws is
lacking in any overall theory, full of inconsistent concepts, and conspicuously
unstable over time. Id. at 512 n.22.
21. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Competition Rules for the
GATT-MTO World Trade and Legal System, 27 J. WORLD TRADE, Dec. 1993, at
35, 68.
22. Richard Boltuck & Robert E. Litan, America's "Unfair" Trade Laws, in
DowN IN THE DUMPS: ADMINISTRATION OF UNFAIR TRADE LAws 2 (Richard Bol-
tuck & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991) (describing U.S. antidumping and counter-
vailing duty statutes as having been designed to ensure their obscurity and
insulation from the political atmosphere that surrounds trade disputes).
23. Stegemann, supra note 19, at 385-89; Barcelo, supra note 17, at 311-12.
24. The GATTs Safeguard Provision requires that the increased imports
must "cause 'serious injury' to domestic producers...." GATT, supra note 4, at
art. XIX The GATT clauses concerning antidumping measures, by contrast,
provide for "material injury" as a precondition to invoking an antidumping rem-
edy. Id. at art. VI; 1994 AD Code supra note 6. Although the various injury
concepts are devoid of any precise definitions, "it is generally thought that the
'serious injury' test of the escape clause [safeguards] is the most stringent, in
the sense that it is hardest to show that it is fulfilled." JOHN H. JACKSON, THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELA-
TIONS 236-37 (1989) [hereinafter JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM].
25. Palmeter & Spak, supra note 12, at 1150.
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loss to the economy, destroy more jobs than they create and lower liv-
ing standards.... Investigations can be started easily by competitors
who merely want to reduce the pressure of competition. The charges
do not have to be well founded or even accurate.... The mere threat of
an antidumping action chills commerce, reduces competition and
raises prices. The antidumping laws are ambiguous and vague. Produ-
cers never know by which standard they will be held accountable be-
cause there are many standards.... Many of the rules and procedures
used to arrive at a conclusion of dumping are irrational.
2 6
Antidumping policy is not completely indefensible. Econo-
mist Jagdish Bhagwati offers two systemic arguments in de-
fence of antidumping measures. 27 First, he argues that a free
trade regime must "frown upon dumping, insofar as it is a tech-
nique used successfully to secure an otherwise untenable foot-
hold in world markets."28 Second, he argues that the perception
of unfairness in the cheapness of the imported goods under-
mines political support for free trade. 29 He concedes, however,
that antidumping laws are often captured by protectionist forces
and turned into de facto instruments of protection. 30 The ulti-
mate explanation for antidumping measures as we know them
today might be that they are occasionally useful for defusing
political pressures at home. Thus, one writer concludes:
In order to preserve the formal integrity of the system, the parties per-
mit each other the relatively generous use of a "pressure valve" that
has been labelled anti-dumping policy. Thus the de facto justification of
anti-dumping measures is based on the systemic need for an escape
clause rather than on the need for regulation of allegedly unfair trade
practices. 31
Because antidumping laws are susceptible to abuse, partici-
pants in the Uruguay Round expected extensive reform of GATT
antidumping policy. The original draft of the AD Code in the
Dunkel Draft3 2 included major reforms. Later in the Round,
however, negotiators yielded to pressure by the European
Union and the United States and substantially revised the draft
26. McGee, supra note 5, at 561-62. See generally Klaus Stegemann, The
Efficiency Rationale of Anti-Dumping Policy and Other Measures of Contingency
Protection, in NON-TARIFF BARRIERS AFTER THE TOKYO ROUND 21-69 (John
Quinn & Philip Slayton eds., 1982) (explaining why antidumping is economi-
cally inefficient).
27. JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM 33-35 (1988).
28. Id. at 34.
29. Id at 35. But see Stegemann, supra note 19, at 381-83.
30. Bhagwati, supra note 11, at 25.
31. Stegemann, supra note 19, at 382.
32. "THE DUNKEL DRAFT" FROM THE GATT SECRETARIAT (Institute for Inter-
national Legal Information ed., 1992) (Draft Final Act Embodying the Results
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Dec. 20, 1991).
[Vol. 5:277282
1994 ANmIDUMPING CODE
code, watering down some of the changes. 33 In addition, the
narrow standard of review in Article 17.6 of the 1994 AD Code
may further erode the effectiveness of the reforms. Thus, the
new code might ultimately be more favorable to import protec-
tion than the 1979 AD Code.34 The revised code leaves room for
divergent interpretations, and the narrow standard of review
may constrain GATT Panels from instilling consistency in an-
tidumping laws.
Consequently, any assessment of the appropriateness of the
prescribed standard of review in Article 17.6 must bear in mind
the rhetoric and the reality of antidumping law and practice.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE IMPROVEMENTS TO THE
GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
The history of GATT dispute settlement procedures depicts
an interplay between diplomatic and legal means.35 The diplo-
matic method of dispute settlement, also known as the "power
oriented" technique, is characterized by "flexibility of the proce-
dures, control over the dispute by the parties, freedom to accept
or reject a proposed settlement, avoidance of zero sum solutions,
limited influence of legal considerations and the larger influence
of the political weight of the parties."36 By contrast, the legal or
rule-oriented means of dispute settlement enables parties to ob-
tain binding legal decisions in conformity with previously estab-
lished rules. Thus, it limits opportunties for power plays by
either or both parties to the dispute. Both techniques of dispute
settlement are reflected in the GATT dispute settlement mecha-
nism contained in Articles XXII and XXIII of the 1947 GATT,
and in the special dispute settlement provisions of the Covered
33. Gary N. Horlick, How the GATT Became Protectionist-An Analysis of
the Uruguay Round Draft Final Antidumping Code, J. WORLD TRADE, Oct.
1993, at 5, 16. In some respects, however, the revised code improved upon the
previous code by providing greater specificity to some existing rules. Id.
34. Id.
35. See generally JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24
(describing trade law and policy as an intricate interplay of law, economics and
political science); PIERRE PESCATORE & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, HANDBOOK OF GATT
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (1991) (containing a comprehensive collection of GATT
cases); William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.,
51 (1987) (describing the GATT dispute settlement system and the major com-
plaints lodged against it).
36. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Settlement of International and National
Trade Disputes Through the GATT: The Case of Antidumping Law, in ADJUDI-
CATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW 77, 84 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, & Ginther Jaenicke eds.,
1992); see also JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 85-86.
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Agreements. Article XXII encourages the use of consultation and
mediation, while Article XXIII provides for formal dispute
settlement.3 7
Although the GATT legal system has shown an impressive
mixture of both the power-oriented and rule-oriented tech-
niques, it has cautiously but progressively moved toward a more
rule-based system. This shift is understandable because eco-
nomic matters require precision, certainty, and predictability -
attributes of a rule-oriented system. A stable and predictable
dispute settlement system will improve investment decision-
making and enhance global welfare.38 There is no consensus,
however, on the precise extent of legalism needed to achieve
greater transparency and credibility without jeopardizing the
entire system. There is also disagreement as to the best way of
achieving a rule-oriented system. Thus, the GATT dispute set-
tlement mechanism remains vague, and even the rule-oriented
dispute settlement provisions continue to emphasize achieving a
mutually acceptable resolution.
The ambivalence in GATT dispute settlement provisions
and practice can be attributed to the divergent attitudes of the
European Union and the United States toward the international
dispute settlement system. These two powerful economic blocs
are the most frequent participants in the GATT dispute settle-
ment system3 9 and their influence pervades the entire process.
The European Union sees GATT dispute settlement as a
conciliation process leading to mutually acceptable solutions.
Consequently, it is a natural extension of the negotiation pro-
cess through which substantive rules are determined. 40 The Eu-
ropean Union rejects the GATT dispute settlement process as a
law-creating mechanism. This approach, loosely referred to as
the pragmatic approach, minimizes the poisoning effect of litiga-
tion and better accommodates politically disruptive cases,
37. GATT, supra note 4, at arts. XXII, XXIII.
38. See generally JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 24, at
87-88 (enumerating other reasons for preferring a rule-oriented technique in
economic matters). But see Peter Behrens, Alternative Methods of Dispute Set-
tlement in International Economic Relations, in ADJUDICATION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, supra
note 36, at 1 (explaining why ADR is relevant to international economic
relations).
39. Robert E. Hudec et al.,A Statistical Profile of GATT Dispute Settlement
Cases: 1948-1989, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 29 (1993).
40. Ronald A. Brand, Competing Philosophies of GATT Dispute Resolution
in the Oilseeds Case and the Draft Understanding on Dispute Settlement, J.
WORLD TRADE, Dec. 1993, at 117, 121.
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thereby lessening the political pressures on an already fragile
system.41
In contrast, the United States has traditionally favored a
rule-based adjudication approach.42 The European Union
speaks of dispute resolution in terms of "conciliation," while the
United States speaks in terms of "litigation".43 It is worth not-
ing that the United States has recently relaxed its traditional
insistence on strong dispute settlement procedures in antidump-
ing disputes. The increasing participation of the United States
as defendant rather than plaintiff in antidumping cases may ex-
plain this change of position. 44 Naturally, plaintiffs will be more
inclined to insist on strong dispute settlement rules than
defendants.
The relative success of the GATT dispute settlement system
notwithstanding, participants in the Uruguay Round argued
that reforms are urgently needed in certain areas. Some of the
problematic issues identified as plaguing the system include in-
ordinate delays, non-adoption of reports, non-compliance, and a
lack of uniformity caused by the fragmented procedures created
by the 1979 Code. 45 Participants desired a more transparent,
consistent, and predictable system. The need for an enhanced
dispute settlement system was considered so urgent that during
the 1989 midterm Ministerial Review, participants adopted a
set of improvements known as the "1989 Improvements." These
improvements were the precursor to the Uruguay Round
reforms. 46
The reforms on dispute settlement achieved at the Uruguay
Round are embodied in the Understanding on Rules and Proce-
dures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU).4 7 Not all
41. Davey, supra note 35, at 70-73.
42. Id. at 66.
43. Brand, supra note 40, at 122. Americans are content with a relatively
literal interpretation of substantive provisions and tend to use individual cases
to fill gaps and resolve ambiguities. Peter D. Ehrenhaft, The U.S. View of the
GATT, 14 INT'L Bus. LAW. 146, 149 (1986). Europeans, by contrast, view inter-
national agreements such as the GATT as a codification of the customs existing
at the time the agreement was entered into. Id.
44. Palmeter & Spak, supra note 12, at 1148. The shift of the United
States away from its traditional position is evidenced in its proposal on the
standard of review in antidumping cases at the Uruguay Round. Id.
45. See Ivo Van Bael, The GATT Dispute Settlement Procedure, J. WORLD
TRADE, Aug. 1988, at 67, 71-73 (listing several commonly voiced criticisms of
the GATT dispute settlement procedure).
46. The final dispute settlement understanding of the Uruguay Round con-
tains a number of features that are not found in the 1989 improvements.
47. DSU, supra note 7.
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the objectives regarding dispute settlement were realized in the
Uruguay Round, but the general success of the Round is signifi-
cant and encouraging. Some of the reforms included: i) the stip-
ulation of a clear time-frame for the settlement of disputes; 48 ii)
the establishment of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)49
charged with administering and coordinating the GATT dispute
settlement mechanism; 50 iii) a provision for automatic adoption
of panel reports;51 iv) the establishment of an Appellate Body to
hear and determine appeals on questions of law from Panel re-
ports;52 and v) a provision for any persons knowledgeable in in-
ternational trade law to serve as a Panel Member.
Both the new DSU and the special procedures in the Cov-
ered Agreements retain a link with Articles XXII and XXIII of
the GATT.53 Panels are required to adhere to the rules of inter-
pretation of public international law in clarifying the rights and
obligations of Members under the Covered Agreements.5 4
48. Id. at para. 20.1; see also id. at paras. 12.8-.10, 21.4.
49. The General Council of the WTO shall convene, as appropriate, to dis-
charge the responsibilities of the DSB. Agreement Establishing the Multilat-
eral Trade Organization, art. IV.3, in UR RESULTS, supra note 2.
50. Paragraph 1 of the DSU states that dispute settlement will apply to
disputes relating to the consultations and dispute settlement provisions of the
legal instruments annexed to the WTO Agreement. DSU, supra note 7, at para.
1. The establishment of the DSB is intended to curb the confusion that ensued
from the fragmented system created by the Tokyo Round, but the objective of
establishing a uniform system was only partially realized. There are still spe-
cial and additional procedures for the Covered Agreements, some of which are
inconsistent with other texts. Under paragraph 1.2 of the 1993 DSU, inconsis-
tencies are resolved in favor of the special or additional dispute settlement pro-
cedures. Id. at para. 1.2. Although complete uniformity was not achieved, a
more streamlined system and the coordination of the whole system by the DSB
might reduce, if not eliminate, the problem of forum shopping.
51. A panel report or, where there has been an appeal, the appellate report,
shall be adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the parties to the
dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report. Id. at
para. 16.4. Time-frames are stipulated for this purpose: 60 days for adoption of
a Panel report and 30 days for adoption of an appellate report. Id. Automatic
adoption should be applauded even though adoption does not necessarily guar-
antee compliance or implementation.
52. Id. at para. 17.6. The Appellate Body will also serve as an authority on
the interpretation of multilateral trade agreements. Id.
53. See Palitha T. B. Kohona, Dispute Resolution Under the World Trade
Organisation: An Overview, J. WORLD TRADE, Apr. 1994, at 23, 28. This link
ensures the continued usefulness of GATT jurisprudence built up over the years
on the basis of Articles XXII and XXIII. Id. at 28.
54. This requirement will contribute toward enhancing "the security, cer-
tainty and predictability of the system and provide a greater juristic basis for
the decision of the DSB." Id. at 29.
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Generally, the new DSU represents a remarkable shift to-
ward a more rule-based system. Nonetheless, the historic em-
phasis on mutually acceptable solutions has not been
abandoned. 55 Negotiators feared that an overly legalistic sys-
tem might risk the integrity and effectiveness of the entire sys-
tem.56 To some, the continued emphasis on amicable settlement
is considered a point of weakness of the GATT dispute settle-
ment system.5 7 To others, it is the system's strength because it
reflects a recognition of the difficulties involved in the enforce-
ment of legal rights and obligations where economic and polit-
ical realities are often beyond the control of the participating
parties.
The impact of the reforms on antidumping dispute settle-
ment depends on how Panels interpret the standard of review
prescribed in the AD Code. It seems that the strength of the
reforms was deliberately minimized by the inclusion of a narrow
standard of review.
IV. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN ANTIDUMPING
CASES AT THE DOMESTIC LEVEL:
EU AND U.S. COURTS
National legal processes constitute important dimensions
for the implementation of international economic policies.5 8 In
most nations, GATT law is not directly applicable. 59 Conse-
quently, "the effectiveness of GATT's rules depends, [in part,] on
their incorporation into domestic [law] and their enforcement
55. For instance, the DSU urges Panels to give the parties to a dispute
adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution to the dispute,
provides for settlement through good offices, conciliation and mediation, makes
provision for a time controlled consultation process, and urges parties to exer-
cise restraint in the use of the dispute settlement procedures. DSU, supra note
7, at paras. 11.1, 5.1, 4.3, 3.7.
56. Kohona, supra note 53, at 24.
57. Professor Hudec for example, described the GATT dispute settlement
system thus:
GAI Is dispute settlement machinery has been celebrated as a major
victory along the road to enforceable norms-and rightly so. But on
the tree of legal evolution GATT's adjudication machinery is still down
at the level studied by legal anthropologists, right alongside dispute
resolution ceremonies practiced among primitive societies.
Robert E. Hudec, Public International Economic Law: The Academy Must In-
vest, 1 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 5, 6, (1992).
58. See generally JACKSON, WORLD TRADE, supra note 16.
59. See, e.g., Joined Cases 21 to 24/72, International Fruit Co. v. Produckt-
schap voor Groenten en Fruit, 1972 E.C.R. 1219, [1974 Transfer Binder] Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) para. 8194 (1972).
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through domestic [agencies] and courts."60 As the most common
users of antidumping measures, the European Union and the
United States invariably influence the negotiation of substan-
tive and procedural rules at the GATT level. The AD Code re-
quires "[e]ach Member, whose national legislation contains
provisions on anti-dumping measures [to] maintain judicial, ar-
bitral or administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose
... of the prompt review" of the final determinations of adminis-
trative authorities. 6 ' Such tribunals or procedures must be in-
dependent of the authorities whose decisions they review.62
Judicial review of administrative actions is a tool of demo-
cratic governments because it operates as a check on the ex-
cesses of executive bodies. It helps legitimize bureaucratic
decision-making. International trade matters present a special
dilemma, however, because they typically involve political, so-
cial, and economic policy issues about which the courts may lack
judgment. Critics fear that allowing courts a strong role in such
areas might frustrate the policies of elected officials. 63 On the
other hand, it can be argued that because the decision-making
process in international trade matters is largely removed from
public scrutiny, the democratic input is suspect and a stringent
review is, therefore, desirable.
A common feature of judicial review of antidumping deter-
minations in both the European Union and United States is its
introverted nature. Judicial review is undertaken solely from
the point of view of domestic law, with little or no account taken
of the GATT obligations. The rule-based U.S. system has been
criticized as being unduly costly and burdensome, and as consti-
tuting a non-tariff barrier. 64 The EU system vests administra-
tive agencies with wide discretion, the exercise of which the
60. Petersmann, supra note 36, at 119. Implementation by national insti-
tutions enhances the political legitimacy of the GATT system within the domes-
tic realm. Id.
61. See DSU, supra note 7, at art. 13.
62. Id.
63. Thomas J. Schoenbaum & Douglas S. Arnold, Judicial Review of Inter-
national Trade Law Decisions: A Comparative Analysis, in NATIONAL CONSTITU-
TIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIc LAW, supra note 8, at 475, 476. "Judicial
review in international trade matters may disrupt rather than legitimize the
democratic process." Id.
64. See, e.g., Carl J. Green, The New Protectionism, 3 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 1, 15-19 (1981). See also David Palmeter, The Antidumping Law: A Legal
and Administrative Nontariff Barrier, in DOWN IN THE Dumps: ADMINISTRATION
OF UNFAIR TRADE LAws, supra note 22, at 64; cf John Jackson, Perspectives on
the Jurisprudence of International Trade: Costs and Benefits of Legal Proce-
dures in the United States, 82 MIcH. L. REV. 1570 (1985) (analyzing the costs
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European Court of Justice (ECJ) is often reluctant to scrutinize.
Both jurisdictions have come under intense attack from experts
for what is seen as the protectionist flavor of their antidumping
measures.
A. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ANTIDUMPING DECISIONS IN THE EU
Discretion is a key element in EU antidumping law and
practice. 65 EU institutions enjoy a margin of discretion in choos-
ing the means needed to achieve their policies, and they may
alter these means in the exercise of their powers. 66 This wide
discretion is further strengthened by undue confidentiality 67
and the ad hoc nature of their decisions.
The ECJ applies a lax standard of review in antidumping
cases. It defers considerably to the judgment of EU institu-
tions.68 The court limits its review to determining whether the
antidumping authorities committed manifest errors in the as-
sessment of the facts, failed to observe the procedural guaran-
tees of antidumping law or based the reasons for their decision
on considerations amounting to an abuse of power. 69 The ECJ
does not undertake a "searching and careful" inquiry into the
facts to determine whether the agencies have exercised their
discretion in conformity with the international obligations of the
and benefits of the U.S. system and concluding that the benefits far outweigh
the costs).
65. Community institutions enjoy considerable discretion in both the find-
ing of dumping and the determination of injury. Sylvia Ostry, Europe 1992 and
the Evolution of the Multilateral Trading System, 22 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
311, 326 (1990).
66. Case 258/84, Nippon Seiko KK v. Council, 1987 E.C.R. 1923, [1985-86
Transfer binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) para. 14,369 (1987). Although the
EC basic antidumping regulation (EEC No. 2423/88) specifies the relevant eco-
nomic factors to be considered by the Commission in its determination of injury,
the list is merely indicative and leaves the Commission with wide discretion
which is often exploited for naked protectionism. See Bodo Boerner, The Pur-
pose of EEC Antidumping Law, 6 KEio L. REV. 127, 136-37 (1990); Georg Ress
& Joerg Ukrow, Direct Actions Before the EC Court of Justice: The Case of EEC
Anti-Dumping Law, in ADJUDICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES IN IN-
TERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, supra note 36, at 159, 184.
67. For instance, the Commission is entitled to use confidential informa-
tion in constructing a normal value without informing the other party thereof.
Joined Cases 260/85 & 106/86, Tokyo Electric Co. v. Council, 1988 E.C.R. 5855,
[1986-88 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) para. 14,512 (1988). For
a critique of this practice, see Boerner, supra note 66, at 127.
68. James K. Lockett, EEC Antidumping Law and Trade Policy After
Bailbearings II: Discretionary Decisions Masquerading as Legal Process?, 8 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 365, 388 (1987).
69. Nippon Seiko, 1987 E.C.R. at 1923. See also Ress & Ukrow, supra note
66, at 210; Lockett, supra note 68, at 388.
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European Union.70 This scant factual inquiry may preclude the
court from intervening even when the issue is the truth of the
proposition that a product has been dumped and is causing in-
jury.71 The usual reason given for the court's limited involve-
ment is that the court cannot appraise complex economic
conditions.7 2 The ECJ's reluctance to address economic com-
plexities is, to some extent, understandable, given that the court
is not necessarily composed of persons knowledgeable in this
area of law.73 Inherent difficulties may arise when courts assess
complex economic situations, thus they tend to shy away from
cost-benefit analysis. 74 It is questionable, however, whether
this factor alone can justify the considerable measure of defer-
ence shown by the ECJ to EU institutions. 75
The ECJ rarely second-guesses the Commission's judge-
ment on the causal link between dumping and the resulting in-
jury to domestic industries.76 Causation is a matter of judgment
on which reasonable people can differ. Thus, it is difficult to re-
fute the Commission's finding of a causal link.77 In deciding
whether to impose a duty, EU institutions are free to take into
consideration community interests calling for protection and the
objectives of the EC Treaty. In practice, the EU's interest has
been equated with the need for protecting an ailing European
70. In the United States, some courts have shown their readiness to engage
in a "searching and careful" inquiry into the facts to determine whether the
agencies have exercised their discretion in a manner consistent with the legisla-
tive intent of the underlying law. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
71. Brian Hindley, Antidumping Action and the EC: A Wider Perspective,
in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, supra note 8,
at 386.
72. Nippon Seiko, 1987 E.C.R. at 1923.
73. On this point, the U.S. system has an edge because the Court of Inter-
national Trade (CIT), which hears antidumping cases, is a specialized court
whose judges are more likely than not to be well-versed in trade and economic
issues. GATT Panels are also more likely to be composed of experts in trade
and economic issues.
74. Hindley doubts that antidumping cases necessarily require the court to
perform complex economic assessments. He argues that the court is called
upon to do simple arithematic, which it is well disposed to do. Hindley, supra
note 71, at 386.
75. Undue discretion leads to corruption and protection of special interests.
It undermines predictability and transparency. On the other hand, absence of
discretion sacrifices flexibility, which could sometimes be adverse to national
interests. Jackson, supra note 64, at 1581.
76. See Lockett, supra note 68, at 400.
77. Hindley, supra note 71, at 380.
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industry and the desirability of having a virile European com-
petitor at the global level.7 8
Given the level of discretion at the disposal of EU institu-
tions, it is unfortunate that the ECJ has remained reluctant to
move beyond a literal interpretation of the infringement of pro-
cedural guarantees, commission of manifest errors, or misuse of
powers. 79 A recent decision of the EC General Affairs Council to
abolish the qualified majority vote required to adopt definitive
antidumping measures will, in effect, leave more powers to the
Commission because it will diminish democratic control by the
Member States over the Commission's proposals.80 With inade-
quate legislative and judicial checks and balances, the discre-
tionary regulatory policies of the EU will remain "re-distributive
politics for the benefit of the powerful and protectionist producer
lobbies and to the detriment of EC consumers."8 1 Hindley con-
cludes that EU antidumping policy has become not a means of
restoring conditions of fair trade between EU producers and
their foreign competitors, but a means of tilting the playing field
sharply against those foreign competitors.8 2
The 1994 Antidumping Code may necessitate some changes
in EU antidumping law and practice. The EU may have to
change its method of calculating normal value and export price
in cases involving related sales companies, and its treatment of
negative dumping.8 3 The enhanced specificity in the Code rules
may also limit the discretion enjoyed by EU institutions. The
Code remains vague, however, on many issues and could be in-
terpreted to justify the old ways.84
78. Stegemann, supra note 19, at 393-94.
79. It is apparent that the ECJ is too busy and lacks the time necessary to
conduct in-depth review in antidumping cases. Thus, one regrets the denial of
antidumping jurisdiction to the more recent Court of First Instance. The Court
of First Instance was a lost opportunity for a deeper level of judicial scrutiny
over the antidumping determinations of Community institutions.
80. See Paul Waer & Edwin Vermulst, ECAnti-Dumping Law and Practice
After the Uruguay Round-A New Lease of Life?, J. WORLD TRADE, Apr. 1994, at
5,8.
81. Petersmann, supra note 21, at 81.
82. Hindley, supra note 71, at 385.
83. These are some of the most unfair and criticized aspects of EC an-
tidumping law and policy. Waer & Vermulst, supra note 80, at 21.
84. Id.
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B. JuDIciAL REVIEW OF ANTIDUMPING DECISIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES
The Court of International Trade (CIT)8 5 and the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) adjudicate most of the
international trade disputes in the United States. Appeals go to
the CIT from the antidumping and countervailing duty determi-
nations of the International Trade Administration (ITA) or the
International Trade Commission (ITC).8 6 The CIT also hears
appeals concerning applications for orders directing the agencies
to make confidential information available. Final judgments of
the CIT may be appealed to the CAFC.
The CIT's standard of review can be placed into two catego-
ries. In reviewing preliminary determinations of agencies, the
court confines its consideration to whether such determination
was "arbitrary, capricious or otherwise contrary to the law."8 7
The standard for reviewing final determinations is whether the
determination was supported by "substantial evidence . . . or
otherwise not in accordance with the law."88 These standards
are essentially identical to those applied by U.S. courts gener-
ally under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) when they
review non-trade decisions of other agencies.8 9
As a general principle, U.S. courts show deference to admin-
istrative agencies since those charged with administering a stat-
ute possess some expertise in the area, and courts should not
rush to second-guess their judgments. Thus, de novo review is
uncommon in most review of agency decisions. 90 This is an im-
portant principle of administrative law in the United States and
the Supreme Court has often reiterated the need for reviewing
courts to adhere to it. In Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
85. The CIT was established by Congress in 1980 pursuant to Article III of
the U.S. Constitution. Because it is an Article III court, CIT judges possess
security of tenure and guaranteed non-reduction of salary. This guarantees
more independence in the discharge of their judicial functions.
86. The ITA determines whether a foreign product is being dumped, while
the ITC determines the existence of injury to domestic industry. These deter-
minations are made more or less simultaneously, which enhances the potential
for fairness in the U.S. system.
87. Algoma Steel Corp. v. U.S., 865 F.2d 240, 241 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
88. Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. U.S., 744 F.2d 1556, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
89. The APA generally establishes a "substantial evidence" standard for
agency actions taken on a record, and an "arbitrary capricious" standard for
other agency action. See 28 U.S.C. § 2640(d) (1994).
90. In antidumping cases, de novo review applies only to disputes on the
confidentiality of information submitted to the ITC.
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Defense Council,9 1 the Supreme Court explained the role of the
courts as follows:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question
at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambigu-
ously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the
court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute.... In such a case, a
court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision
for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency.
We have long recognized that considerable weight should be ac-
corded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme
that it is entrusted to administer .... 
9 2
The above passage embodies the principle of deference as
applied under U.S. administrative law. This same principle ap-
plies to the review of trade decisions by the courts. The CAFC
has overturned a number of CIT decisions for failing to strictly
adhere to the limits imposed by this principle.93 In reviewing
the determinations of the ITA and/or ITC, the CIT is not to sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the agency, provided the agency's
interpretation is "sufficiently reasonable."94 This directive
stands whether the court is applying the "arbitrary and capri-
cious" test or the broader standard of "substantial evidence."9 5
The CIT is required to uphold any permissible interpreta-
tion of an ambiguous provision of the trade statutes. Given that
antidumping laws are vague, various provisions may allow for
more than one reasonable interpretation. Thus, the court will
often defer to an agency. The agency's interpretation need not
be the one the court would have adopted had the question ini-
tially arisen in judicial proceedings. Like the ECJ, U.S. courts
rarely consider GATT law in deciding the antidumping cases
before them; when they do, they resolve any conflict in favor of
domestic legislation that is later in time.
91. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
92. Id. at 842-44 (footnotes omitted).
93. See, e.g., Springfield Ind. Corp. v. U.S., 842 F.2d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
94. American Lamb Co. v. U.S., 785 F.2d 994, 997 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
95. Id.
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Notwithstanding the limitations imposed by the principle of
deference, the CIT's review is more liberal than the ECJ's. In
some cases, the CIT had taken an activist posture and has been
more intrusive than it should be given the principle of deference.
Indeed, the court "has not hesitated to substitute its views for
those of the ITA and ITC" in some cases.9 6 The CIT ensures that
agencies exercise their discretion in accordance with the legisla-
tive intent of the underlying law. It remands cases for further
proceedings where the agency fails to properly articulate its
determinations. 97
The CAFC hears appeals from the CIT. Such appeals are
infrequent because decisions must be final before appeals can be
made. The CAFC undertakes a mere systemic review of the CIT
decision and shows deference to agencies. The CAFC has some-
times acted as a check on the activist posture of the CIT by over-
turning non-deferential decisions. 98
There is significant opportunity for judicial review of an-
tidumping determinations in the United States. The legalistic
nature of its antidumping system seemingly enhances the
chances of fairness;99 however, it has been abused by frivolous
petitioners to the detriment of competition. 100 The ,U.S. stan-
dard of review is narrow, but seems liberal compared to the ECJ
standard of review. At a minimum, the occasionally intrusive
attitude of the CIT is preferable to the deferential attitude of the
ECJ. Nevertheless, the reality of both systems is that they are
tailored to shield domestic producers from foreign competition.
Thus, while "the United States applies protectionist rules, the
European Community applies protectionist discretion. The re-
sult in both cases is protection." 10 1
96. See JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 10, at 677.
97. See, e.g., USX Corp. v. U.S., 655 F. Supp. 487 (CIT 1987). For a discus-
sion of the CITs influence on the conduct of antidumping and countervailing
duty investigations, see James A. Toupin, The U.S. Court of International
Trade and the U.S. International Trade Commission After 10 Years-A Per-
sonal View, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 10, 12 (1990).
98. See American Lamb, 785 F.2d at 994.
99. Although antidumping proceedings have the appearance of adjudica-
tions, they are not subject to the procedural safeguards of the APA. The ITA
considers the proceedings to be non-adjudicatory, as does the CIT. See Budd
Co. Ry. Div. v. U.S., 507 F. Supp. 997 (CIT 1980).
100. See Bhagwati, supra note 11, at 25.
101. J. Michael Finger, The Origins and Evolution of Antidumping Regula-




IV. GATT PANEL REVIEW OF NATIONAL AUTHORITIES:
LIMITING GATT'S INFLUENCE BY
STANDARD OF REVIEW
It is uncertain whether GATT Panels should defer to the
factual and legal findings of national authorities in antidumping
cases or whether Panels should second-guess such findings.
Such deference may not be compatible with the goal of checking
the protectionist abuse of antidumping laws and measures by
national agencies. If Panels are mere figureheads for rubber-
stamping the protectionist determinations of national agencies,
then the GATT may be unable to prevent the use of antidumping
measures to undermine the goals of the global trade regime. On
the other hand, Panels that are too intrusive and indifferent to
the efforts of national agencies could jeopardize the legitimacy
and effectiveness of the GATT. Neither of the two extreme posi-
tions is palatable for the GATT. The difficult intellectual task,
then, is how to use the concept of standard of review as an effec-
tive instrument for allocation of power. The primary goal of this
task is to hold the balance between an over-intrusive GATT
Panel and a figurehead Panel. It is difficult to craft the level of
deference that will be compatible with the need to check protec-
tionist antidumping practices. The dilemma is accentuated by
some policy issues and practical considerations typical of the in-
ternational constitutive order.
A. JUDIcIAL REVIEW BY INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS: THE
PRIMACY OF DOMESTICITY
The authority of domestic courts to sit in review of executive
actions is firmly established in most of the world's democracies.
In many democratic nations, courts are significant institutions
of public order and the ultimate arbiters of the legality of gov-
ernment actions. That notwithstanding, courts consider it in
the interest of their institutional integrity to exercise restraint
whenever necessary. They resort to various doctrines to explain
their prudential deference to the political branches.
At the international level, the effectiveness of judicial re-
view is suspect. The emotive effects of the municipal courts as
symbols of public order cannot be transposed to the interna-
tional legal system. The functional limits of judicial bodies are
highly magnified at the international level, in both trade and
non-trade areas. The international political system involves
unique problems, and various policy issues must necessarily be
considered when crafting legal institutions or appraising their
1996]
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performance in the global constitutive process. For any interna-
tional legal framework to be workable it must take into account
the distribution of effective power. Elegantly crafted interna-
tional documents can be inspiring, but are worthless if unwork-
able. This explains the continued popularity of power-oriented
techniques of dispute settlement at the international level. It
explains why the GATT continues to emphasize that an amica-
ble settlement is to be preferred. The present state of the inter-
national legal system precludes rigidity in constitutional
measures. 
10 2
The tendency of other nations to compromise to pressure
from the European Union and United States to largely limit the
standard of review in antidumping cases should be viewed in
this light. Antidumping measures are very sensitive in both the
European Union and the United States, and these "big powers"
consider unrestricted review by GATT Panels as unpalatable.
The political realities at home may cause them to disobey unfa-
vorable outcomes from an unrestricted review. International
trade decision-making is more politics than law. GATT dispute
settlement requires not only giving effect to agreed rights and
obligations, but at the same time keeping in mind the frustrat-
ing limitations imposed by political, economic and social fac-
tors. 10 3 States are still reluctant to leave the determination of
issues of vital national interest in the hands of third parties over
whom they have no control. Sovereignty and protection of na-
tional interests continue to be symbols of resistance to interna-
tional adjudication. 10 4 The common denominator is the use of
standard of review to limit the power of Panels to produce re-
sults that will be politically unpalatable at home and that could
question the legitimacy of the global trade system. To this ex-
tent, standard of review is a means to allocate power.
102. A similar difficulty arises in the United Nations' constitutional process.
The dilemma therein is how to balance the wisdom of imposing constitutional
restraints on the Security Council with the need for swift and effective enforce-
ment of international security in times of threat. As one commentator noted,
"[t]he intellectual task will be to see to what extent responsible participation
and constitutional control can be made compatible with effective security." W.
Michael Reisman, Note, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87 AM.
J. INV'L L. 83, 98 (1993).
103. Kohona, supra note 53, at 24.
104. The first proposed global trade organization, the ITO, became stillborn
in the U.S. Congress largely because of fears that such organizations would
encroach upon U.S. sovereignty. Similar fears were strongly expressed by Sen-




Policy issues aside, there are also practical difficulties that
serve to limit the effectiveness of judicial review at the interna-
tional level. One readily cited example is the limited fact-find-
ing capabilities of international tribunals. Limited resources
and jurisdictional problems imposed by parties to a case may
hamper effective fact-finding by GATT Panels. Any justification
based on presumed expertise of domestic agencies is not strong
in the GATT situation, however, because Panels are more likely
to be better experts on GATT law than the domestic administra-
tive agencies whose objectivity will often be suspect. Justifica-
tions based on functional considerations are more tenable.
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW PRIOR TO THE 1994 AD CODE
Until the 1994 AD Code, there had been no express provi-
sion on the standard of review in GATT antidumping law. 10 5
Panels, however, confronted this issue in a number of cases.
GATT Panels have carefully avoided taking a definite position
on this issue. In the absence of specific provisions, Panels were
apparently free to go to any depth in the review of both the fac-
tual and legal findings of the national authorities. The interpre-
tive agreements on dispute settlement seem to suggest that "...
panels may not only decide legal questions de novo, but are
under no obligation to show any deference to the factual findings
of municipal authorities". 10 6 Antidumping reports show that
while Panels recognized this apparent plenary reviewing au-
thority, they nevertheless exercised restraint in most cases by
choosing to dispose of cases on procedural, rather than substan-
tive, grounds. While Panels showed restraint, they also resisted
any attempts by parties to unduly constrain the Panels' power to
review the cases before them. Panels had more flexibility.
In New Zealand - Imports of Electrical Transformers from
Finland, New Zealand raised the question of the appropriate
standard of review to be applied by a Panel in reviewing its in-
105. Neither the 1979 AD Code nor the Dunkel Draft had any specific provi-
sion relating to standard of review.
106. Andrew W. Stuart, Note, "I Tell Ya I Don't Get No Respect:" The Policies
Underlying Standards of Review in U.S. Courts as a Basis for Deference to Mu-
nicipal Determinations in GATT Panel Appeals, 23 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 749,
774 (1992) (citing Jackson's observation of the GATT Treaty's "considerable am-
biguity about the appropriate role of third-party decision-making" (citation
omitted)).
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jury determinations.' 0 7 New Zealand contended that the deter-
mination of material injury was a matter specifically reserved,
under the terms of Article VI:6(a), to the contracting party levy-
ing the antidumping duty.' 08 It stated that while other con-
tracting parties may inquire whether such a determination has
been made, they may not inquire into the nature of the determi-
nation itself.10 9 In effect, New Zealand argued that the Panel's
standard of review was limited to merely verifying whether the
determination of injury was actually made, and that Panels
could not go further to question the accuracy or validity of such
determination. 1 0 Such analysis required the narrowest stan-
dard of review, which would have left Panels as mere rubber-
stamping agents for national authorities. New Zealand predi-
cated its argument mainly on sovereignty grounds."' Finland
on the other hand, argued for the broadest possible review, con-
tending that to allow contracting parties full discretion in the
determination of injury would "open the door to anarchy without
the possibility of international surveillance."" 12
The Panel rejected New Zealand's interpretation of the
standard of review. It first agreed with New Zealand that "the
responsibility to make a determination of material injury caused
by dumped imports rested in the first place with the authorities
of the importing contracting party concerned."" 3 The Panel
then continued:
However, the panel could not share the view that such a determination
could not be scrutinized if it were challenged by another contracting
party. On the contrary, the panel believed that if a contracting party
affected by the determination could make a case that the importation
could not in itself have the effect of causing material injury to the in-
dustry in question, that contracting party was entitled,... that its
representation be given sympathetic consideration and eventually, if
no satisfactory adjustment was effected, it might refer the matter to
the Contracting Parties.... To conclude otherwise would give govern-
ments complete freedom and unrestricted discretion in deciding an-
tiduinping cases without any possibility to review the action taken in
the GATT. 114
107. GATT Dispute Settlement Panel, New Zealand-Imports of Electrical
Transformers from Finland, BISD 32d Supp. 55 (1988) (panel report adopted
July 18, 1985).
108. Id. at 61.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 62.
111. Id.
112. Id.




The Panel upheld New Zealand's dumping finding, but re-
jected its material injury determination. 115 Note, however, that
the Panel ultimately reviewed only the methodology by which
the New Zealand Customs Department arrived at its injury de-
terminations. 116 The Panel did not, strictly speaking, examine
the specific facts on which the Department's conclusions were
based.
A similar argument for a very narrow standard of review
had been raised and rejected in an earlier case involving Swed-
ish antidumping duties." 7 In this case, the Panel reasoned that
the condition in Article VI forbidding the imposition of an-
tidumping duties unless "certain facts had been established,"
creates an obligation in the importing country to "establish the
existence of these facts when its action is challenged." 118
The question of the appropriate standard of review for
Panels in antidumping cases was again raised in the Swedish
complaints against U.S. antidumping duties on stainless
steel."19 The United States considered standard of review as a
"central and novel question" to be addressed in the dispute. 20
Influenced by its administrative law doctrine, the United States
distinguished between de novo review and systemic review and
argued that the Panel's review should be limited to the latter.' 2 '
It noted that agencies conducting antidumping investigations
are usually confronted with hundreds of decisions and judgment
calls.' 22 The United States then argued as follows:
The dispute settlement mechanism of the Agreement could be applied
to accomplish a variety of objectives, ranging from the examination of
each of the many administrative decisions or judgment calls on the one
hand to a broader, systemic analysis of the consistency with the Agree-
ment of determinations by investigating authorities on the other. The
first approach most closely resembled de novo review while the second
approach reflected the type of systemic review traditionally under-
taken by a court of appeal. A review of antidumping determinations in
the context of a dispute settlement procedure under the Agreement
115. Id. at 68.
116. Id.
117. GATT Dispute Resolution Panel, Sweden-Swedish Anti-Dumping Du-
ties, B.I.S.D. 3d Supp. 81 (1955) (panel report adopted Feb. 26, 1955).
118. Id. at 85-86.
119. GATT Dispute Resolution Panel, United States-Anti-Dumping Duties
on Imports of Stainless Steel Hollow Prods., GATT Doc. ADP/47 para. 3.11
(1990) [hereinafter Stainless Steel].
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. Specifically, the Panel noted agencies such as the U.S. Department
of Commerce and the U.S. International Trade Commission. Id.
19961
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was most appropriately conducted in accordance with the second, sys-
temic type of review. The US recognized, however, that any mechanism
for review of antidumping determinations must necessarily include a
consideration of issues of fact as well as issues of law. The relevant
question, therefore, was what was the appropriate level of scrutiny
that a reviewing body should apply to a consideration of the factual
findings made by the national investigation authority which had com-
piled the administrative record.... Absent evidence that an investigat-
ing authority deliberately acted in a way which would prejudice the
outcome of an investigation in favour of one party or was seriously neg-
ligent in the manner in which it conducted the investigation, it was
appropriate that a judicial body reviewing the results of an investiga-
tion accord some deference to the judgment of the investigating
authority. 123
The above passage is, perhaps, the most detailed articulation of
the question of standard of review before a GATT Panel. To its
credit, the United States did not dispute that a Panel's review
must necessarily involve both issues of fact and law. It regarded
this as settled. What was not settled, according to the U.S. ar-
gument, was how much deference Panels should give to national
authorities. In addition, the United States contended that Swe-
den should not be allowed to introduce new evidence or raise
fresh arguments which its exporters had not raised in the pro-
ceedings below. 124 On its part, Sweden argued that Panels
should reconsider all evidence and show no deference to the fac-
tual conclusions of national agencies.' 2 5 It contended that the
Panel should undertake a detailed analysis of the factual infor-
mation on which the U.S. agencies based their determinations.
The Panel declined the parties' call to formulate general
standards of review, and ruled instead that it would be more
appropriate to examine and decide arguments and legal issues
as they arise in relation to specific matters in dispute.' 2 6 The
Panel also rejected the U.S. argument that Sweden be precluded
from adducing new evidence. There was, however, no specific
ruling on this point.
Recent antidumping cases also raise the question of the ap-
propriate standard of review. Dictum in United States - Anti-
Dumping Duties on Gray Portland Cement and Cement Clinker
from Mexico apparently suggested a de novo review that would
123. Id.
124. Id. at para. 3.9.
125. Id. at para. 3.12.
126. Id. at para. 5.3.
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enable Panels to reweigh evidence. 127 In contrast, the Panel in
Korea - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Polyacetal Resins
from the U.S., preferred a limited review of a systemic nature. 128
The Panel stated that its task was to examine "whether the fac-
tual basis of the findings articulated in the determination was
discernible from the text of the determination and reasonably
supported those findings."129
C. ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION OF STANDARD OF REVIEW AND
OTHER PROCEDURAL ISSUES:
The following points are evident in the U.S. articulation of
the question of standard of review in the Stainless Steel Case.
1. Scope is Limited to the Administrative Record
In most domestic jurisdictions, a reviewing court generally
confines its review to the record compiled by the administrative
agency. 130 This review-on-the-record principle seems not wholly
settled at the GATT level. It could be a contentious issue given
that the parties at the national and GATT proceedings are dif-
ferent.13 ' This issue is related to the question of exhaustion of
arguments which is discussed below. Since Panels are review-
ing the determinations of an investigating authority, it is not
unreasonable that they be expected to confine their review to the
record developed by the agency. It goes without saying, how-
ever, that the Panel should not confine itself to the record if
there are credible allegations that the agency refused to include
certain relevant information in the record. In GATT antidump-
ing proceedings, parties usually agree with regard to the full-
ness of the record, but disagree on the legal consequences and
interpretation.
127. See GATT Dispute Resolution Panel, United States-Anti-Dumping
Duties on Gray Portland Cement and Cement Clinker from Mexico, GATT Doc.
ADP/82, para. 5.11 (1992) [hereinafter Mexican Cement].
128. See GATT Dispute Resolution Panel, Korea-Anti-Dumping Duties on
Imports of Polyacetal Resins from the United States, GATT Doc. ADP/92, para.
228 (1993).
129. Id. at para. 227.
130. East Chilliwack Fruit Growers Co-op v. U.S., 665 F. Supp. 499, 504
(CIT 1987) (holding that the CIT's review of an action is restricted to the admin-
istrative record).
131. The text of Article 17.5(b) of the 1994 AD Code, however, seems to im-
ply a review-on-the-record principle because it requires the Panel to examine
the matter "based upon the facts made available in conformity with appropriate
domestic procedures to the authorities of the importing Member." 1994 AD
Code, supra note 6, at art. 17.5(b).
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2. Deference to National Authorities
It is plausible to say that Panel review of a long and com-
plex fact-gathering and evaluating proceeding should not
amount to a re-evaluation of the evidence. The fact that the
GATT allows the national authorities to be in charge of the ini-
tial determinations demands that Panels show some deference
to the judgment of those authorities. The degree of deference
depends on the standard of review adopted by the reviewing
body, which may differ depending on whether factual or legal
conclusions are being reviewed. The "arbitrariness" and "abuse
of discretion" standards allow for greater deference than the
"substantial evidence" standard.
The argument for deference is very strong in the context of
factual review because, to some extent, Panels' fact-finding ca-
pabilities are limited. The process for determining the level of
deference to be accorded an agency's findings is devoid of any
mathematical precision. In Stainless Steel, the United States
argued that a Panel should defer to national authorities once it
determines that an authority was neither deliberately prejudi-
cial nor seriously negligent in the conduct of the investiga-
tions.1 32 This seems identical to the "abuse of discretion"
standard, which would leave domestic agencies with a plenitude
of unsupervised discretion, to the detriment of complainants.
Because suspicions of protectionism are common in antidumping
disputes, a very high level of deference is not appropriate. It
will only serve to benefit those nations whose domestic stan-
dards of review are very lax.
Deference in the context of legal interpretations presents a
more difficult question under the GATT. Some writers are of the
view that questions of law should be reviewed de novo.133 They
reason that, unlike national tribunals, GATT Panels review de-
terminations for conformity with GATT law, not for conformity
with the national law applied in the action.134 National courts
often ignore GATT-based arguments in their review. Thus, on
the question of deference to legal findings, it can be argued that
there is nothing to defer to since the Panel level marks the first
consideration of GATT law vis-a-vis the facts.13 5 National au-
132. Stainless Steel, supra note 119, at para. 3.11.
133. See Palmeter & Spak, supra note 12, at 1157.
134. Id.
135. See James R. Cannon, Jr. & Karen L. Bland, Comment, GATT Panels
Need Restraining Principles, 24 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1167, 1173-77 (1993).
U.S. courts defer to agency interpretations where there is no explicit statutory
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thorities cannot claim to have greater expertise over GATT law
than the Panels themselves. Nevertheless, there is merit in ar-
guing that since the GATT contemplates that individual con-
tracting parties will administer the antidumping code, Panels
should defer to national agencies' interpretation and practice. 13 6
The difficult task is to balance this with the goal of uniformity in
the system.
3. Exhaustion of Remedies
The implication of the exhaustion rule is that complaining
governments should be precluded from adducing, before the
Panel, any evidence that was not raised by their exporters dur-
ing the domestic proceedings. This also could be two-dimen-
sional, involving exhaustion of legal issues and exhaustion of
factual arguments. The United States voiced this contention in
Stainless Steel, by objecting to the admissibility of certain claims
and arguments by Sweden which the Swedish exporters had not
presented during the domestic proceedings. 137 The United
States raised a similar objection in Anti-Dumping Duties on Im-
ports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon, 138 by arguing that
the failure of Norway or private Norwegian respondents to raise
certain claims before the investigating authorities and "exhaust
administrative remedies" precluded Norway from raising them
before the panel.' 39 Anyone trained in the common law rules of
appellate procedure might favor the U.S. contention, but GATT
Panels are neither U.S. appellate courts nor common law
Panels. It is not surprising, therefore, that the GATT Panel
overruled the U.S. objection. The Panel stated as follows:
[Aln examination by the panel of Norway's claims concerning initiation
of the anti-dumping investigation and the comparison of average nor-
mal value with individual export prices was not precluded by the fail-
ure of the Norwegian government or Norwegian respondents to raise
these issues before the investigating authorities.
140
language to the contrary and where the agency has made a reasonable interpre-
tation. Id.
136. Id.
137. Stainless Steel, supra note 119, at para. 3.9.
138. GATT Dispute Resolustion Panel, United States - Imposition of Anti-
Dumping Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Nor-
way, GATT Doc. ADP/87, para. 331 (1992) (panel report adopted Apr. 1, 1994).
139. Id.
140. Id. at para. 351. In addition, the Mexican Cement case Panel agreed
that "even if the issues relating to initiation and cumulation had not been
raised during the domestic administrative proceedings, these issues could be
considered by the panel." Mexican Cement, supra note 127, at para. 5.11. By
contrast, in the Stainless Steel case the Panel appeared to create a requirement
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There is no express requirement in GATT law for exhaust-
ing remedies available in the domestic arena or for exhausting
every argument that could be raised later. 141 Precluding gov-
ernments from raising arguments not raised at the domestic
proceedings could produce hardship. The private respondents in
the domestic proceedings may, for a variety of reasons, be un-
able to adduce certain evidence or raise certain claims. Such in-
ability may not apply to the respondents' government when the
latter takes the dispute to the GATT. The complaining govern-
ment should not suffer unduly because of problems incurred
during the domestic proceedings. Allowing new claims to be
raised at the Panel proceedings will not unduly prejudice the re-
spondent government because they will have ample time to
reply.
In the case of non-compliance with the Code's provisions
concerning the presentation and proper evaluation of evidence
during the investigation, the argument on exhaustion of reme-
dies should not be entertained. Therefore, a Panel should seek
to know whether the exporter(s) had real opportunity to raise
the arguments in question before the domestic proceedings and
may disallow new claims if it finds that the exporters had such
opportunity. In Stainless Steel, the Panel noted that Sweden
had not contended that its exporters were not "given ample op-
portunity to present all evidence that they consider useful in re-
spect of the antidumping investigation in question."
1 42
According to the Panel, where there is no such allegation of non-
compliance, the Panel should only verify whether, in evaluating
factual evidence, an investigating authority had erred mani-
festly on an essential element or had acted in a clearly abusive
manner. 143
that the complaining government show that its exporters were denied ample
opportunity to present certain evidence or arguments before such new evidence
is allowed before the Panel. Stainless Steel, supra note 119, at para. 5.3.
141. See Palmeter & Spak, supra note 12, at 1158-59. Palmeter and Spak
argue that the issue of exhaustion of remedies is misplaced because the applica-
ble law at GATT-level review is different from that applied at the domestic
level. Id. at 1158. The question remains whether there is any radical difference
in substance, and whether a requirement to exhaust remedies and arguments
can be implied from the provisions of Article 17.5(b) of the 1994 AD Code.
142. Such opportunity is required under Article 6.1 of the 1994 Antidump-
ing Code. 1994 AD Code, supra note 6, at art. 6.1.
143. Stainless Steel, supra note 119, at para. 3.11.
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V. POST-URUGUAY ROUND: ANALYSIS OF THE
STANDARD OF REVIEW IN ARTICLE 17.6 OF
THE 1994 AD CODE
Pre-Uruguay Round GATT law had no express provisions
on the standard of review for antidumping cases before
Panels.144 Much depended on the whims of the Panelists. To-
ward the end of the Uruguay Round, this procedural issue as-
sumed unprecedented importance. The United States, backed
by the European Union, prevailed over other parties and finally
had some provisions on standard of review included in the AD
Code. The United States would rather have the standards
spelled out than rely on the whims and shifting attitudes of the
Panelists.
The standard of review is set forth in Article 17.6 of the AD
Code which provides as follows:
In examining the matter in paragraph 5:
i) in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall deter-
mine whether the authorities establishment of the facts was proper
and whether their evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objec-
tive. If the establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation
was unbiased and objective, even though the panel might have reached
a different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned;
ii) the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement
in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public interna-
tional law. Where the panel finds that a relevant provision of the
Agreement admits of more than one permissible interpretation, the
panel shall find the authorities' measure to be in conformity with the
Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations.
14 5
A. REVIEW OF FACTS
The provision on the review of facts requires Panels to defer
to the evaluation of facts made by the national authority if it
finds such evaluation unbiased and objective and the factual es-
tablishment proper.1 46 The paragraph does not contain enough
guidance. It does not specify how deeply a Panel can probe the
appropriateness and objectivity of an authority's evaluation.
Given the "mischief" sought to be cured by stipulating a stan-
dard of review, it is certain that a second evaluation of the facts
by Panels is not intended. However, it seems that Panels may
do more than merely look at the facts to determine the objectiv-
ity of the authorities.
144. See supra Part IV.B.
145. 1994 AD Code, supra note 6, at art. 17.6..
146. Id.
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It is not clear who bears the burden of persuasion. Should
the complaining government bear the burden of showing that
the establishment of facts was not proper and/or their evalua-
tion biased and subjective? This can be a very heavy burden. 147
Since antidumping rules constitute an exception under GATT,
the burden of showing objectivity and lack of bias should be
borne by the government that imposed the duties.
It is not easy to determine whether the standard contained
in Article 17.6(i) embraces the "substantial evidence test" or the
"arbitrariness test." The first arm of paragraph 6(i), which re-
quires Panels to determine whether the factual establishment is
proper, would imply at least the arbitrariness standard, but the
second arm with the phrase "unbiased and objective" is poten-
tially a looser standard.148 Proof of bias and subjectivity will be
particularly difficult in those aspects of antidumping determina-
tions that involve questions of judgment. For example, both in-
jury determination and causation involve some elements of
judgment on which reasonable people can differ. Many conclu-
sions of the national authorities may find an escape route here.
Panels should overturn an authority's conclusion, however, if it
finds the authority's investigation to be so restricted in scope, so
shallow in execution or so half-hearted as to constitute a pretext
or sham.
B. REVIEW OF LAW
The phrase "permissible interpretation" governs Panel re-
view of questions of law. An antidumping measure by a national
authority shall be found to be in conformity with the Agreement
if it rests on one of many permissible interpretations of the rele-
vant provision. It is immaterial that the Panel would have pre-
ferred an alternative interpretation. Given the continued
vagueness of the AD Code, many provisions will readily support
more than one permissible interpretation. The potential for
multiple interpretations could undermine the uniformity of
GATT law. Experience has shown how each of the principal
users of antidumping measures had in the past exploited the
vagueness of some provisions to serve their respective self pur-
poses. If Panels cannot impose a uniform interpretation, the re-
147. See Waer & Vermulst, supra note 80, at 9 (observing that Panels may
choose to place the burden on the complaining party to show "bias and subjec-
tivity" in the evaluation of the facts, which could result in a heavy burden of
proof).
148. Id. at 8.
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suit will be what some writers have called a "Tower of Legal
Babel." 149 The language of paragraph 6(ii) would prevent
Panels from substituting their own interpretation even when
they feel that the larger purposes of the GATT would be better
served.
Another problem is that the distinction between law and
fact is malleable. 150 Very often, "questions of fact shade into the
spectrum of conclusions and vice versa".' 51 Where the line of
distinction is drawn depends on the posture of the reviewing
body. 152 A Panel determined to escape the narrow confines of a
deferential standard of review can characterize a question of fact
as one of law. 153
Panels are required to interpret the relevant provisions of
the Agreement in accordance with customary rules of interpre-
tation of public international law. The Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties codifies the rules of interpretation of trea-
ties. 5 According to the Convention, a treaty should be inter-
preted according to "the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose."1 55 Where the text of agreement is silent, inter-
pretation of a treaty should consider the treaty's negotiating his-
tory, preparatory work, any subsequent practical construction
adopted by the parties and the subsequent conduct of the par-
ties. Thus, subsequent practice of Members in the application of
their antidumping laws will be entitled to weight by the Panels
when there is need to resolve ambiguities.
C. ROLE OF THE APPELLATE BODY
The provision for the establishment of a standing Appellate
Body constitutes a major novelty in the new Dispute Settlement
Understanding. This Body shall entertain only questions of law
arising from decisions of Panels. 56 It shall undertake only a
systemic review of the issues presented on appeal.1 57 It can up-
149. See Palmeter & Spak, supra note 12, at 1158.
150. See Stuart, supra note 106, at 760-63.
151. Id. at 762.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 760-63.
154. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/conf. 39/27, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, art. 31 (1969)
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
155. Id. at 691, art. 31.
156. See UR RESULTS, supra note 2, at art. 17.6.
157. Id. at art. 17.
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hold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of a
Panel. 158 This is a further step toward judicialization of the
GATT. The Appellate Body can bring about a guided crystalliza-
tion of legal principles through a consistent interpretation of
GATT Agreements. Where a Panel holds that a relevant provi-
sion of the Code supports more than one permissible interpreta-
tion and thus endorses a Member's antidumping measure, the
Appellate Body can reverse the Panel if it thinks that said provi-
sion does not support multiple interpretations. In this way, the
Appellate Body could become the ultimate guardian of the con-
sistent and uniform application of antidumping laws. This will
enhance the predictability and acceptability of the dispute set-
tlement system as parties will have a second chance to challenge
legal conclusions of Panels. In addition, Panels will be more
careful in discharging their functions knowing that their deci-
sions may come under the scrutiny of a higher body. Appellate
rulings may acquire precedential value as Panels may begin to
refer to previous appellate interpretations in disposing of cur-
rent disputes, thus paving the way for stare decisis in the GATT
legal system.
VI. CONCLUSION
An omnipotent GATT Panel with sweeping powers of review
may likely render the global trade structure dysfunctional. At
the same time, a rubber stamp judicial system will do a great
harm to the trade body. The reality of the global trade system in
particular, and the international political and legal system in
general, demands a pragmatic approach to antidumping cases.
Restraint is the key word: it is necessary to preserve institu-
tional legitimacy. Domestically, separation of powers, presumed
administrative expertise, and judicial lack of time are some of
the justifications given for limited judicial review. Internation-
ally, the best justifications are founded in policy considerations,
including the primacy of domesticity.
Standard of review enforces the desired restraint. It pre-
serves the allocation of power between different bodies. In the
GATT system, standard of review is intended to draw a balance
between the need for international surveillance of antidumping
measures and the clamor by member nations to have their sov-
ereignty, as exercised through their various domestic agencies,
respected. Although GATT Panels had in the past declined to
158. Id. at art. 17.13.
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formulate any general standards of review, they had in many
cases shown restraint by reviewing the methodologies used by
the respondent government rather than re-evaluating the facts
of each given case. One of the possible impacts of article 17.6 is
that the flexibility of Panels to choose among options will be
eroded. If the conclusions of the domestic agency fall within per-
missible interpretations, the Panel must uphold them even if it
thinks that the larger purposes of GATT will be better served by
an alternative interpretation. How this provision reflects on fu-
ture cases will depend on how often Panels hold provisions to
support more than one interpretation.
In analyzing Article 17.6, one should bear in mind the polit-
ical sensitivity of antidumping matters and the fragile nature of
the global trade system. Thus, while complaining that the stan-
dard contained in Article 17.6 is too lax, one should ask whether
a broader standard would be functional. Given the new auto-
matic regime and tougher rules against unilateralism, a broader
standard of review in antidumping cases might be unworkable,
not because Panels lack the needed expertise to make a detailed
review, 159 but because the big powers do not want them to do so.
The main users of antidumping measures would still want such
measures to serve the systemic need for a pressure valve.
The impact of the 1994 AD Code will, to some extent, de-
pend on how the standard of review plays out in the practical
functioning of Panels. It is possible that the GATT's influence in
this area may be diminished if Panels construe Article 17.6 too
restrictively. Article 17.6 has many escape routes that could, if
left unsupervised, be exploited by respondent governments.
Much will depend on the integrity of Panels. "It can only be
hoped that Panels will be alert to the dangers of using the es-
cape language in Article 17.6 and will stand up to their responsi-
bility of ensuring a consistent, fair and uniform application of
the GATT antidumping law."160 If Panelists meet this responsi-
bility, differences between pre-Uruguay and post-Uruguay
Panel review of antidumping determinations of national author-
ities may not be too radical.
It is important to remind Members that the survival of the
trade system depends on their willingness to exercise self re-
straint in the use of antidumping measures to exclude foreign
159. Consider the fact that a broader standard of review was approved for
patent cases where the big powers will be more of complainants than respon-
dents-a double standard? That is the power game.
160. Waer & Vermulst, supra note 80, at 9.
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competition. Antidumping measures pose a threat to liberal
trade, and this threat will grow with the expansion of the "an-
tidumping club."161 We must avert an antidumping war. While
the big powers may have prevailed in limiting the GATT's influ-
ence in this area, they should realize that one cannot eat one's
cake and still have it. Their exporters will be subject to the con-
sequences of the same lax standard of review. Thus, regarding
the position of the Unites States on the question of standard of
review, some writers have observed as follows:
[Diomestic exporters are a constituency, decidedly secondary at this
point, but apparently growing in importance. Their interests present
the true political problems for government. Whatever rules the United
States agrees to live with on behalf of industries that compete with im-
ports, it must be prepared to live with on behalf of its exporters as well.
The United States cannot plausibly demand more deference for its own
decisions than it is willing to concede to the decisions of other
governments. 1
62
161. The AD Code is compulsory for all Members of the WTO.
162. Palmeter & Spak, supra note 12, at 1166 (emphasis added).
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